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Over the last six months, the prospects of an Israeli preemptive strike against 
the Iranian nuclear weapons program have been much discussed. Back in 
early February, media reports suggested that the US Secretary of Defense, 
Leon Panetta, was increasingly concerned about a possible ‘window’ for an 
Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities during the months of April, May 
and June.1 The Israelis said they feared the Iranian nuclear program would 
soon enter a ‘zone of immunity’ when it would become harder to stop by 
military means.
President Obama, in his speech to the American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee Policy Conference on 4 March 2012 underlined his determination 
to use diplomatic pressure and sanctions to persuade Iran to turn away 
from a nuclear program. But he stressed too that he would ‘take no options 
off the table’. And he specifically disavowed the option of ‘containing’ a 
nuclear‑armed Iran: ‘Iran’s leaders should understand that I do not have a 
policy of containment. I have a policy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear 
weapon.’2 His conversation with Prime Minister Netanyahu in the White House 
in early March was clearly intended both to reassure the Israelis and to take 
some of the time‑sensitivity out of the issue. 
The Baghdad meeting between Iran and the P5+1 (US, Russia, China, 
UK, France and Germany) in May did not yield a conclusive agreement 
constraining the future of Iran’s nuclear program. Yes, it seems the Iranians 
have agreed to address some of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s 
(IAEA) concerns about clarifying past nuclear activities. But they haven’t 
agreed to address the international community’s concerns about the 
future of their program. Yes, they have agreed to meet the P5+1 again in 
Moscow later in June. But they remain resolute about their entitlement to a 
uranium enrichment program and currently show no willingness to trade that 
entitlement for sanctions relief and internationally‑provided reactor fuel. Yes, 
it’s true Iran is still not close to having an actual nuclear weapon. But, in 2012 
key actors are looking for solid evidence of Iran’s willingness to wind back 
its enrichment program, and to place its nuclear facilities under proper IAEA 
inspection. If such willingness is not forthcoming, other scenarios—more 
drastic and costly—become more likely.
The Americans seemed to have discussed critical indicators with the 
Israelis, and the unclassified literature suggests they argued strongly for 
using uranium enrichment levels as a key barometer of the program’s rate 
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of progress. But that’s a two‑edged sword. Certainly, while the Iranians are not 
enriching beyond the 20% level they are not moving towards a bomb. But the more 
Iranian stocks of medium‑enriched uranium grow, the more ominous the equation 
becomes. Getting from 20% enrichment to 90% enrichment is easier than making 
the initial enrichment jump from 0.7% to 20%. And Iran’s acquisition strategy for 
medium‑enriched uranium looks open‑ended: while it says it wants to be able 
to provide its own fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, it already has stocks of 
20%‑enriched uranium that would allow for many years of operations.3
Meanwhile, the Americans continue to argue that even if the Iranians were intent 
upon weaponisation—and Washington believes that such a decision has not yet 
been taken—the process itself would take some time. In a February hearing before 
the US Senate Armed Services Committee, James Clapper, Director of National 
Intelligence was asked how long it might take for Iran to build and deploy a nuclear 
weapon. Senators cited Secretary Panetta’s estimate that it could take a year to 
build a bomb and then another one to two years to place it on a delivery vehicle. 
Clapper generally agreed with those estimates, but argued that the one‑year figure 
(for building a nuclear weapon) was ‘technically feasible, but practically not likely.’4
So far, the Iranians don’t seem to be making any sudden push towards 
weaponisation. Indeed, they probably judge the tempo and tone of the current 
program as best meeting their needs—ambivalence suits them very well. So the 
assessment that the US intelligence community has been running for some time 
now—that Iran has not had a formal nuclear weapons program since 2003—might 
still be true. Still, the real worry about Iran is not that it has a structured program—
which would make it an easy and obvious target of international reaction—but that it 
continues to slide towards a shorter and shorter timeframe if it does decide to make 
nuclear weapons.5 The international community can’t accept a position that John 
Carlson has labelled ‘safeguarded proliferation’: ‘Any outcome where Iran simply 
tolerates safeguards inspections while it prepares to break out—in effect a situation 
of safeguarded proliferation—would provide only false assurances and discredit the 
IAEA safeguards system.’6
With actual construction and deployment of an Iranian nuclear weapon still a 
few years away, and Iran not pressing the envelope of militarization for fear of 
drawing greater retribution, enrichment rates seem likely to be the principal driver 
of near‑term events. Substantial enrichment beyond the 20% level, for example, 
would increase dramatically the prospects of a military strike against Iran’s nuclear 
facilities. In the meantime, sanctions will be given a chance to work—but not much 
of a chance. The growing ferocity of the sanctions is actually a silent testimony to 
the fact that the sanctions must show quick results.
Media reports suggest Netanyahu has bought into this position, albeit without 
enthusiasm. In April he told a news conference that Iranian economic difficulties 
had not succeeded in pushing the Iranian nuclear program backwards, ‘even a 
millimetre’,7 an interesting formula since a large part of the public debate over the 
merits of a preemptive strike concerns just how much the Iranian program could 
be set back by such an event. Even Netanyahu would probably concede, though, 
that an on‑going campaign of disruption against the Iranian nuclear program—the 
Stuxnet virus and the assassinations of key Iranian scientists—has borne fruit. 
Israel might still have further cards to play in that regard.
For all those reasons, news reports in Israel suggesting that the initial April–June 
window has been pushed back have a ring of credibility to them. A recent report in 
The Jerusalem Post, for example, titled ‘Confrontation with Iran may be delayed to 
2013’ tells just such a story.8 In the meantime, it’s likely the Americans are doing a 
full court press around the region, in an effort to build regional support for both the 
sanctions, and for the idea that more serious alternatives will follow if the Iranians 
move further towards weaponisation.
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There have even been signs of division within Israel about the wisdom of a military 
strike on the Iranian facilities, suggesting that Israel’s national security elite is still 
engaged in an internal debate about the costs and benefits of such an option. 
Senior military and political figures have spoken publicly about their preference 
for other options or the inability of Israel to achieve its desired outcomes through 
military means. Those figures include former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, the 
former internal security chief Yuval Diskin, ex‑Mossad chief Meir Dagan, former 
head of intelligence for the Israeli Defense Forces Shlomo Gazit, and the head 
of the Israeli Defense Force Benny Gantz. This is an impressive chorus line of 
opposition to any near‑term Israeli strike.
Some say that Israel simply couldn’t conduct an effective strike against Iran—
that the task is just too difficult. There’s no denying that a strike would be much 
more challenging than the strikes they made against the Iraqi Osirak reactor (in 
June 1981) or against the Syrian reactor site (in September 2007). The target set 
is much more numerous and diversified, and it is further from Israel’s airbases. 
But it might not be a good idea to conclude that Israel will step back from a 
surgical strike concentrated on the key choke‑points of the Iranian program just 
because of the difficulties involved. (Those choke‑points are four: the Natanz and 
Fordow enrichment plants, the Isfahan uranium conversion facility, and the Arak 
heavy water plant.) In Tel Aviv, there is an acute sense of concern about Iranian 
proliferation: in a choice between the difficult and the unacceptable, the difficult wins 
every day.
Just how developed is the Iranian program?
In an annex to its November report last year, the IAEA detailed what it knew or 
suspected about the Iranian program. The annex—in fourteen pages—outlined the 
possible military dimensions of the program, based on a range of information that 
the IAEA had collected itself over the years, supplemented by other information 
provided by more than ten member states. The level of detail provided in the annex 
was unprecedented. And the agency assessed the information upon which it based 
its findings as ‘overall, credible’.9 
As the agency summarised the situation:
‘The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are 
relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device:
•	 Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and 
materials by military related individuals and entities;
•	 Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material;
•	 The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation 
from a clandestine nuclear supply network; and
•	 Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including 
the testing of components.’10
Among the specific allegations, the IAEA alleged that Iran had, over a course of 
decades, pursued components for an explosive device, worked on the development 
of a detonator system with possible application to a nuclear explosive device, 
experimented with the initiation of high explosives, and conducted hydrodynamic 
experiments applicable to nuclear device simulation. The report alleged that a 
large explosives containment vessel had been constructed at the Parchin military 
base—access to the base has been denied since by the Iranians—and that Iranian 
weapons designers had studied how to integrate a new spherical payload into the 
re‑entry vehicle of the Shahab‑3 missile.
4Iran’s nuclear program—and the costs of stopping it
The two IAEA reports released since the publication of the annex—one in February 
and the last in May—both detail the steady continuation of the enrichment program. 
By February Iran had installed many more centrifuge casings at both the Natanz 
and Fordow plants, albeit not the centrifuge rotors inside the casings. And by 
May, Iran had made steady progress in its manufacture of larger quantities of 
low‑enriched and medium‑enriched uranium—enough, analysts concluded, to 
provide sufficient uranium for five nuclear weapons if the enrichment level could 
be raised to 90%. Just as worrying, media reports suggest the most recent IAEA 
inspection at Fordow uncovered trace elements of uranium enriched up to 27%. 
What does Iran want? The answer isn’t clear. The Iranian nuclear program has 
typically been seen as driven principally by Persian strategic ambition rather than 
just the immediate policy ambitions of the current political elite. Over the years, 
more immediate security concerns have also played their part: the Iran–Iraq war, 
the display of US firepower during Desert Storm, and the subsequent US overthrow 
of Saddam Hussein have all reinforced Tehran’s anxieties. According to Ray 
Takeyh, ‘The need to negate the American and Iraqi threats has been the primary 
motivation.’11 It’s possible too that the Iranian leadership has drawn a lesson from 
the Libya case—that it’s best not to give one’s bomb away. With the program 
essentially under the control of Iran’s hardliners, and with ideology playing only a 
minimal role in driving it, it seems unlikely that Tehran will negotiate away an asset 
that it has spent decades developing.
Iran and the world
Ironic though it may seem to the casual reader nowadays, Iran has for centuries 
been drawn into closer contacts with the West. But those contacts took a 
tremendous hit in 1979 when the US embassy in Tehran was stormed and US 
citizens were taken hostage and in the aftermath of the tumultuous events of that 
year. The relationship with Washington is still brittle more than 30 years later, 
characterised by what Parag Khanna calls ‘hostage politics’.12 
In recent years, some analysts have suggested that Iran has despaired of rebuilding 
its relationships with the West, and has consciously turned to the East to find a set 
of partners amongst India, China and Russia.13 Russia has been an active partner 
for Iran in finishing and fuelling the Bushehr reactor (construction was begun by a 
German firm in 1975, but abandoned after 1979). The Indians have been only a 
weak critic of the Iranian nuclear program, and have seen Iran as a counterweight 
to Pakistan, and a partner in terms of their shared interests in keeping the Taliban 
out of power in Afghanistan. The Chinese have seen Iran as a critical energy 
supplier for China’s own industrialisation. Each of the three has given Iran new 
lifelines to a world that increasingly looks less Western‑dominated. And each has 
been able to build on patterns of shared interests with Iran that aren’t much diluted 
by Western opposition to ‘Iran and all its works’. 
Can sanctions reverse Iran’s current priorities? There’s no doubt that Iran is feeling 
the pain from the current sanctions regime—and finding a strategy that dilutes those 
sanctions is an important short‑term foreign policy objective for Tehran (as we saw 
at the Baghdad talks). But the lengths that Tehran has gone to over the years to 
conceal major parts of its program suggest Iran’s looking for a halfway house where 
it can have its cake and eat it too. And that’s not going to be enough to reassure 
its neighbours. 
A clouded future
If negotiations can’t constrain Iran’s nuclear program, more drastic and costly 
options would take their place. An Israeli military strike would sour Tel Aviv’s 
relationship with Washington, risk opening a wider regional war in the Middle East, 
potentially incite Iranian‑inspired terrorist attacks against those Tehran believed 
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complicit in the attack, and perhaps strengthen Iranians’ support for the nuclear 
program itself. Obviously, the Israelis hope that if any military strike were to be 
required, the US would bear the brunt of conducting such an operation, since the 
degree of damage to the Iranian program would be greatly increased. But overt 
Iranian nuclear proliferation is unacceptable—to the Israelis, Sunni states in the 
Middle East, and Obama. And safeguarded hedging, where Tehran creeps slowly 
closer to having the wherewithal for a rapid breakout is intolerable—although 
perhaps not equally intolerable to all parties. Indeed, it risks a situation where the 
different parties—even those who purport to be on the same side—find they have 
different ‘red‑lines’ for military action. Nuclear latency doesn’t always spur the 
clarion call to action that actual weaponisation does.
The current Israeli leadership is not necessarily inclined to accept that the costs 
of an Israeli strike might outweigh the benefits. Some of the reasons are entirely 
personal. Benjamin Netanyahu’s brother, Yonatan Netanyahu, was the one 
Israeli soldier killed during the Entebbe rescue operation in Uganda in 1976. In 
opening a memorial to Netanyahu’s brother in 2005, the president of Uganda, 
Yoweri Museveni, spoke about the way in which the Israeli raid on Uganda had 
convinced the rebels (Museveni was an anti‑Amin guerrilla at the time) that Idi 
Amin’s regime was vulnerable rather than powerful.14 So in Tel Aviv, at the moment, 
we have a government that might well see an Israeli military strike on Iran as an 
empowering event.
We aren’t out of the woods on this one yet.
Implications for Australia
The Iranian nuclear program is an important issue for Australia—it goes to the heart 
of our own concerns about proliferation, a stable Middle East, and secure global 
energy supplies. So where do we go from here? Australia wants to see a peaceful 
solution to the current difficulties relating to the Iranian program. To do that, it 
has an interest in maximizing the sanctions pressure on Iran in order to change 
Tehran’s cost‑benefit analysis about its program. Australia, like others, should not 
oppose the creation of a civil nuclear program in Iran. Still, the issue of sensitive 
nuclear technologies is critical here: if Iran is to have enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, it’s always going to have to live under close inspection from the IAEA. 
Ideally, Australia would want a solution to the Iranian issue that entailed Tehran’s 
acceptance of fuels supplied by an outside power—as Russia is doing at Bushehr—
or from an international fuel bank. But Iran is not attracted to that option.
Of course, if a military strike against Iran does unfold, there’s a genuine possibility 
of Iranian retaliation against what it might well perceive as ‘Western’ forces within 
striking range. Some of the ADF elements currently deployed in the Gulf might be at 
risk of an Iranian strike, although they certainly would not be as likely a target as US 
forces operating in the same area. A military strike on Iran would likely have a range 
of consequences, and some of those might—indirectly—fall on us.
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